PARTISANSHIP, TRUMP FAVORABILITY, AND CHANGES IN SUPPORT FOR TRADE

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PARTISANSHIP, TRUMP FAVORABILITY, AND CHANGES IN SUPPORT FOR TRADE

Abstract

Why has the relationship between partisan identification and Americans' trade attitudes shifted in recent years? We suggest that recent shifts in trade attitudes among partisans are driven by Donald Trump, who staked out a position on trade that is at odds with the position on trade traditionally held by Republicans. Using panel data from the Voter Study Group (VSG) surveys from 2011, 2016, and 2017, we conduct cross-sectional analyses showing that the relationship between partisanship and trade attitudes has shifted dramatically from 2011 to 2016/2017; in 2011, Republicans were significantly more supportive of expanded trade, but by 2016/2017 the relationship had reversed, with Democrats significantly more supportive of trade. We link changes over time in trade attitudes with how Americans evaluate Trump: individuals with favorable attitudes toward Donald Trump are significantly more likely to shift their attitudes in an anti-trade direction from 2011-2016. Because so many more Republicans have favorable attitudes toward Trump, the aggregate effect of Trump favorability is to shift Republicans as a group to be less favorable toward trade than Democrats. We suggest that Donald Trump has had a transformative effect on Americans' trade attitudes, with previous supporters (opponents) of expanded trade now expressing opposing (supporting) attitudes.

Key words: international trade, trade attitudes, presidential influence, Donald Trump
Word count: 9,806

International trade has always been a contentious issue. Mainstream economic theories hold that trade has distributional effects that generate winners and losers, and these distributional effects magnify conflict over trade policies. While the benefits of trade are dispersed widely, job losses or lower wages arising from trade tend to be concentrated in particular sectors of the economy. As a result, expanded international trade often creates a rather vocal set of opponents who connect job losses or lower wages to trade (cf., Lukinovich, Nurullayev, and Garand 2020), while the widely-dispersed beneficiaries are often less vocal in their support of expanded trade. The strong opposition to expanded trade among some segments of the American workforce creates opportunities for political elites to appeal to anti-trade sentiment or, in some cases, to manufacture or magnify those sentiments.

During the 2016 presidential election campaign, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump worked to take full advantage of deep economic anxieties associated with trade, particularly among Americans employed in vulnerable economic sectors. Trump deviated from the mainstream Republican position of supporting expanded trade and international free markets by adopting an economic nationalism stance rooted in concerns about what trade was doing to key segments of the American economy. Trump engaged in harsh anti-trade rhetoric during the campaign, targeting economic competitors (particularly China) and promising to reshape trade regimes by increasing tariffs, breaking down established trade agreements, and reducing the American trade deficit.

What was the effect of Trump's intense trade rhetoric on how Americans think about trade? One might reasonably speculate that Trump's rhetoric had the effect of shifting his supporters (particularly Republicans) in the protectionist direction. It is also possible that the effect of Trump's rhetoric on his (mostly Democratic) political opponents would be in the opposite direction, with Trump critics moving off their normal pattern by becoming more favorably oriented toward expanded trade. The partisan divide on trade has certainly been evident in the United States. Republicans have traditionally staked out a position in favor of free and expanded trade, while Democrats—who have organized labor as part

of their electoral coalition--have traditionally staked out a position that is more favorable to protectionism. The key question is: does a divisive presidential candidate holding a trade position going against traditional partisan patterns shift the trade opinions among the American public?

The purpose of this paper is to explore the changing role of partisan identification in shaping Americans' attitudes toward trade, particularly the role played by Donald Trump in shifting partisans' trade attitudes. We demonstrate that *Republicans* were *more* likely than *Democrats* to support expanded trade at the outset of our study in 2011, prior to the Trump presidential candidacy and his harsh anti-trade rhetoric. By 2016 the relationship between partisan identification and support for trade liberalization had flipped, with *Democrats more* likely to support expanded trade than *Republicans*. What accounts for this shift? Using panel data for 2011, 2016, and 2017 from the Voter Study Group (VSG) surveys, we trace changes in trade attitudes at the individual level and consider whether there are systematic patterns in attitudinal change that can be tied to support for Donald Trump. We find considerable evidence that changes in individuals' trade attitudes are linked to Trump evaluations, both in general and for both partisan groups. Trump support not only has an important impact on Republicans' trade opinion changes, but for Democrats as well. There appears to be a strong "follow the leader" effect—to use Lenz (2012) term—in explaining shifts in trade attitudes.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing literature offers a wide range of different theoretical explanations for individual trade preferences and the importance of those preferences in the formation of trade policy. Prior studies find that both economic and non-economic factors shape individual trade preferences. Economists suggest that individual skills (i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin model) and individual ties to specific economic industries (i.e., Ricardo-Viner model) both shape individual trade policy preferences (Ohlin 1967; Midford 1993; Scheve and Slaughter 2001, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Beaulieu et al. 2011). Besides economic factors, scholars suggest that demographic attributes such as age, gender, national identity, racial identity, and

education level all explain individuals' trade opinions (Rankin 2001; Mansfield et al. 2014; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Cohen 2001). Moreover, sociotropic considerations and identity-based attitudes (such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, and isolationism) also play important roles in shaping individual trade preferences (Guisinger 2017; Mansfield and Mutz 2009).

What about the effects of partisanship on trade attitudes? For most of the period since World War II, Republicans have promoted trade liberalization to a greater extent than Democrats. By the late 1950s, Republican members of Congress were more likely to support legislation supporting free trade than their Democratic colleagues. In the postwar era, while Republicans were shifting away from an anti-trade stance, Democrats' pro-trade stance was fading (Hiscox 1999). By the mid-1970s, the voting gap on trade policy between congressional Republicans and Democrats continued to widen. By 1991, Republicans consolidated their pro-trade stance by initiating and supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while a majority of Democrats were opposed (Wink, Livingston, and Garand 1996; Weller 2009; Guisinger 2017). During the period from 1970 to 2012 Republicans were more supportive of congressional trade bills and treaties and less supportive of trade limits than Democrats.

During the 2016 presidential election, the dynamics of trade opinion among the American public changed dramatically. During the Republican primary and presidential campaigns, the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump embraced stark protectionist view on trade policy, promising to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to revisit all free trade agreements (FTAs), and to impose tariffs on Chinese and Mexican imports. In a nutshell, Trumps' criticism of free trade policies and the unprecedented trade policies that he proposed led Trump to be described as an anti-establishment or an "anti-Republican" Republican candidate (Sullivan and Johnson 2016).

There is some evidence that partisanship matters in the assessment of the effects of trade, with rank-and-file Republicans and Democrats divided in their assessments. In 2006, both Republicans and Democrats were equally skeptical (38%) about trade being able to create jobs and job security in the

U.S. However, by 2016 Republicans became less likely (34%) and Democrats more likely (47%) to perceive trade as an opportunity for creating jobs in the U.S. (Chicago Council 2016). When one compares data from May 2015 and October 2016, Republican and Republican-leaning voters' negative perceptions of free trade agreements increased from 39% to 68% (Pew Research Center 2016a). These findings suggest that the partisan tinge to American views of free trade shifted in 2016, and this shift coincided with the development of the Trump presidential campaign. During his campaign, 72% of Trump supporters held negative perceptions of free trade agreements (Pew Research Center 2016b), suggesting that Trump's presidential campaign had the effect of entrenching negative trade attitudes among his supporters.

Researchers have generated a rich body of research on the political economy of individual trade policy based on economic and non-economic factors at the individual level. However, few studies provide a comprehensive explanation for why Republicans' trade opinion shifted so dramatically in a short span of time. Republicans' recent negative attitudes toward trade appear to be less motivated by ideological concerns or individual economic circumstances but more motivated by Donald Trump's anti-trade positions and rhetoric. Indeed, drastic change in Americans' trade opinion has led one commentator to state that "American public opinion has been Trumpified" (Matthews 2018). However, the role of elite leadership has rarely been emphasized in systematic studies of changes in trade attitudes. This study is motivated by the prospect of understanding how individuals' perceptions of political leaders—in particular, Donald Trump—shapes their attitudes towards international trade—especially changes in trade attitudes over time.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS

Following the Leader: Trump's Impact on Trade Opinion

Democratic theories emphasize the role played by voters' policy preferences in shaping policy adoption. In democracies, political leaders are seen as responsive to public opinion due to the threat of

electoral punishment. In this context, elected officials determine economic policies—including international trade policies—based on voters' demands and preferences in order to increase their chances in subsequent elections.

Alternatively, the congruence between policy preferences of politicians and the public opinion can be explained by leadership effects. Political elites can often influence public opinion in the desired direction (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Lenz 2012). The 2016 presidential election was perceived as a change-driven election, and Donald Trump was perceived as an agent of these changes. Instead of supporting popular policy positions (especially among Republicans), he proposed bold policy changes in many areas, including shifts away from traditional Republican policy positions.[1] His arguments and rhetoric about international trade drew attention from the public, particularly that segment experiencing economic anxiety that could easily be connected rhetorically to trade.

The constraining of politicians' policy stances by public opinion—seen as a hallmark of representative democracy—seems inadequate to explain how Americans' attitudes toward trade changed as the 2016 election approached. Instead, the possibility of influence by a political leader in shaping public opinion on trade seems plausible and requires empirical investigation. The median voter theorem suggests that citizens influence the policy stances of politicians (Downs 1957), yet it does not account for all aspects of the connection between mass opinion and elite preferences/behavior. In particular, it does not account for the possibility that political leaders can create policy congruence not by moving their positions to that of the median voter but rather by moving the position of the median voter toward their positions. In order to understand the Trump phenomenon as it relates to Americans' trade attitudes, we need to engage with other aspects of the voter calculus beyond ideology or policy preferences—including the personality and charisma of political leaders—that the median voter

[1] Kertzer, Brooks, and Brooks (2021) suggest that going "against type" on an issue (e.g., trade) may make leaders more persuasive and induce greater public support, particularly where political parties are perceived by the mass public to have a "distinct foreign policy brand."

theorem does not consider. Simply, Trump does not behave as a rational seller who changes the products he offers to meet consumer demand. Rather, he appears to stick to his own policy agenda rather than march toward the center, and he has used the force of his personality to sell his policy agenda to receptive voters.

Perhaps the most important contribution to the literature on leadership effects in recent years is Lenz (2012), who raises the question of whether citizens are leading or following on matters of public policy. To answer this question, he examines the empirical basis of policy adoption and opinion leadership in a series of experiments. He finds that voters who view debates tend to adopt their favored candidates' position on the expansion of a children's health care program (SCHIP). Even though individuals' vote intentions were initially out of line with their favored politicians' policy view, they apparently do not reevaluate their support for their favored politicians based on the politicians' positions on the issue. Persuasive appeals by leaders can influence followers' attitudes and behavior, but Lenz' findings demonstrate that candidates can shape public opinion on certain issues, even without making persuasive appeals. In other words, voters do not always evaluate their support for their favored politicians based on their policy positions; rather, citizens can be led to adjust their policy preferences to match the policies that their favored politicians adopt.

Another point to consider is how increased salience of policy issues affects citizens' desire to follow their leaders. After the issue of investing Social Security funds became salient and the public learned about the positions favored by George Bush and Al Gore, they still adopted their own favored leader's position regardless of demographic, partisan, or ideological differences (Lenz 2009; 2012). In other words, priming of the issue led individuals to learn about Bush's and Gore's positions on this issue, which then induced them to follow the policy positions of their preferred candidate. This phenomenon of "following the leader" is consistent across policies; when individuals learn their favored leaders' policy position, they tend to follow their favored candidates (Lenz 2009; 2012). However, "following the

leader" does not imply that citizens always blindly follow their favored candidates. Some individuals have their own strong policy views and hence do not simply follow their favored candidates on complicated issues such as international trade. However, Lenz' evidence suggests that at least some individuals may follow their preferred candidate even on the most salient issues of the day because of the lack of information and lack of incentives to become informed. Under these conditions, once individuals learn the position of their favored candidate, many are inclined to adopt those positions as their own.

Voters may follow the policy lead of favored candidates in the absence of persuasive justification for such policy views (Broockman and Butler 2017). When voters learn that candidates' policy positions differ from their own, they may simply adopt their favored candidates' position to resolve the dissonance. For instance, Broockman and Butler (2017) explore whether political elites could influence public opinion and avoid electoral cost by simply announcing their positions without making "persuasive argument and appeals to citizens' values" (2017: 216) Using field experiments, they assign political elites' policy positions to voters as treatments and discover that candidates can successfully shift public opinion on issues even without persuasive appeals.

Voters' evaluations of candidates or party policy stances may also be shaped by the likeability of candidates or party leaders. Candidates or parties can be perceived as close to voters because of their likeability based on their personalities, overall appeal to voters, or other attributes (Belluci et al. 2015). In other words, leaders may have a direct effect on voters' preferences based on these personality-related attributes.

Regarding trade, there is some evidence of a Trump effect in shaping Americans' trade opinion. Essig, Xu, Garand, and Keser (2021) use cross-sectional data from the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES) to explore the effects of Trump's protectionist views on how Americans think about opposition to import restrictions and support for free trade agreements. They find a strong Trump

effect: individuals with favorable attitudes toward Trump were more likely to support import restrictions and oppose free trade agreements, and this effect is particularly strong among individuals with high levels of political knowledge. The Trump effect on trade opinion is robust even after the authors account for possible endogeneity between Trump evaluations and trade attitudes.

What does all of this suggest about changes in trade attitudes among the American mass public during the 2010s? As noted, Republicans had been more supportive of international trade than Democrats prior to the 2016 election. However, the relationship between partisanship and support for trade flipped by 2016 and 2017 (Mutz 2017). What accounts for this shift? We suggest that the movement of Republicans in an anti-trade direction and of Democrats in a pro-trade direction is linked to leadership effects associated with Donald Trump and his anti-trade rhetoric. What this means is that individuals who hold favorable views toward Trump should be more likely to shift their positions on trade from favorable in 2011 to unfavorable in 2016 and 2017. Since Republicans are more likely to hold favorable trade views in 2011, and since Republicans are more likely to hold favorable views toward Trump, we expect that the effects of Trump favorability will move many Republicans into the anti-trade direction. The reverse should be true for Democrats: those with strong unfavorable views toward Trump can be moved in the direction of greater support for trade. In other words, Trump political opponents can take his strong anti-trade rhetoric as a negative cue and further distance themselves from his anti-trade position. Based on these arguments, we propose our hypotheses concerning the effect of Trump in altering Americans attitudes on trade:

Hypothesis 1a: *Supporters of Donald Trump are more likely to shift their trade policy preferences in the anti-trade direction.*

Hypothesis 1b: ***O****pponents of Donald Trump are more likely to shift their trade policy preferences in the pro-trade direction.*

DATA AND METHODS

As noted, the goal of this paper is to (1) explore how the effects of partisan identification on Americans' trade attitudes shifted in recent years, during which time trade has been a contentious issue, and (2) assess the degree to which any shifts were due to "follow the leader" effects associated with Donald Trump. In order to explain the partisan shift of trade opinion over time, it is necessary to have panel data that permits us to identify individuals' trade attitudes at one point in time and subsequently whether the same individuals shift their trade attitudes at a later time point. Further, one can use panel data to ascertain the degree to which there are systematic patterns in changing trade attitudes, particularly as they relate to trade attitude changes that can be linked to different partisan groups. We contend that the shift in partisan attitudes toward trade is driven in part by the transformative effect of Donald Trump, whose highly charged rhetoric relating to trade—with a focus on economic nationalism and the negative consequences of international trade agreements—have departed significantly from those of traditional Republican elites. We contend that Donald Trump was instrumental in shifting the effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes.

The Voter Study Group (VSG) survey, a panel study that includes waves for 2011, 2012, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019, permits us to study the over-time change of individuals' attitudes in trade and determine the explanations for the shift. Comparable survey questions relating to trade are available in the 2011, 2016, and 2017 waves, so we can determine who has changed their trade attitudes over time. Our study is based on data from these three waves of the VSG surveys, though we focus our attention on changes in trade attitudes for the 2011-2016 period.[2]

Dependent variables

Our primary dependent variable is a measure of individuals' support for increased trade. In each of the three waves, survey respondents were asked "Do you favor or oppose increasing trade with other

[2] A brief description of the VSG surveys is found in Appendix 1.

nations?" and three responses were coded—favor, oppose, or unsure. We code this variable 2 for those who favor increased trade, 1 for those who are unsure, and 0 for those who oppose increased trade. Because the "unsure" responses represent a substantial proportion of respondents, we retain these respondents in measuring this variable, though the non-substantive nature of these responses means that we treat this variable as a nominal (nonorderable discrete) variable. The distribution of responses for each survey year is presented in Appendix Table A2.1. As one can see, aggregate support for increased trade remained fairly steady between 2011 and 2016, but in 2017 there was a substantial increase in support for expanded trade.

A key dependent variable in this study is *change* in support for expanded trade. Because our measures of trade attitudes for each wave are not ordered, we measure change in trade attitudes by taking each of the nine pairs of joint outcomes for 2011 and 2016 and creating a nine-point nominal scale:[3]

0 Oppose (2011) to oppose (2016)
1 Oppose (2011) to unsure (2016)
2 Oppose (2011) to support (2016)
3 Unsure (2011) to oppose (2016)
4 Unsure (2011) to unsure (2016)
5 Unsure (2011) to support (2016)
6 Support (2011) to oppose (2016)
7 Support (2011) to unsure (2016)
8 Support (2011) to support (2016)

This variable permits us to determine *who* has shifted their trade attitudes, *how* those trade attitudes have shifted, and *the degree to which* those changes are linked systematically to other theoretically-relevant variables. In Appendix 3 we present the raw distribution of changes in trade attitudes for 2011-2016 and 2011-2017.

[3] The scale is based on a cross-tabulation of 2011 and 2016 trade attitudes. This 3*3 cross-tabulation generates nine cells, and we assign each of these cells to a position on the nine-point nominal scale.

Independent variables

Because we are interested in the (changing) effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes, one of our primary independent variables is partisan identification, measured as a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican). In most cases we use a measure of partisanship based on data from the 2011 panel wave, which permits us to capture individuals' political dispositions at the outset of the data collection period and prior to any possible shift in trade attitudes. We do estimate some cross-sectional models in which partisan identification (and other independent variables) are measured using the same panel wave as the dependent variable.

We also consider the degree to which changes in the effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes are affected by how Americans think about Donald Trump. Candidate Trump staked out a strong position (with accompanying strong rhetoric) on trade during the 2016 presidential campaign, and subsequently President Trump adopted a policy stance that most observers would consider to be anti-trade. Trump made a forceful pitch for economic nationalism and a trade policy (including increased tariffs and withdrawal from trade agreements) that is solely in the interests of the United States, and it is reasonable to think that individuals with a favorable view toward Trump might be inclined to shift their attitudes on trade in a negative way that other Americans would not. We measure Trump favorability on a four-point scale, ranging from 0 (very unfavorable toward Trump) to 3 (very favorable toward Trump). Regrettably, Trump was not a major figure on the political scene in 2011, so there is no measure of Trump favorability in the 2011 panel wave, but the variable is measured in both the 2016 and 2017 waves. We expect this variable to be related to an increased probability of opposition to increased trade and a decreased probability of support for increased trade.

Control variables

We also include a range of control variables in our models, including political ideology, personal and sociotropic economic evaluations, education, family income, gender, and racial identification variables. For

the sake of brevity, these control variables (and their expected effect on trade attitudes) are described in Appendix 4. Moreover, a summary of the measurement of each of variables in our analyses is found in Appendix Table A5, and descriptive statistics for the variables in our models are found in Appendix Table A6.

Model estimation

Because our dependent variables are nominal variables, we estimate our models using multinomial logit, which is appropriate for nonorderable discrete variables. We use the "oppose (2011) to oppose (2016)" as the contrast group against which the other groups—representing different configurations of change in trade attitudes from 2011 to 2016—are compared.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Partisanship and trade attitudes

Simple frequencies for the dependent variable—shown in Appendix Table A2.1--show relatively constant trade attitudes from 2011 to 2016 but a discernible increase in levels of support for trade from 2016 to 2017. The fact that there was an overall increase in support for expanded trade does not mean that this increase was uniform across partisan groups. As a starting point, we estimate the effects of partisan identification on support for expanded trade during each of the three panel waves. Republicans have traditionally been thought to be more supportive of trade, though there has been mixed evidence of partisan effects over the past 10-15 years (cf., Mutz 2017). In Table 1 we report multinomial logit coefficients for our model of trade attitudes, estimated separately for 2011, 2016, and 2017. For the sake of brevity and presentational clarity, we present the estimates only for the comparison of support for trade and opposition to trade; the full multinomial logit results are found in Appendix Table A7. As one can see, in the 2011 model we find that partisan identification has a strong positive effect on trade attitudes ($b = 0.122$, $z = 5.29$); simply, in 2011 Republicans are significantly more likely to support expanded trade, controlling for the effects of other independent variables. On the other hand, the relationship between

partisan identification and trade attitudes is *negative* in 2016 (b = -0.083, z = -3.53) and 2017 (b = -0.102, z = -2.94), indicating that in the Trump era it is now *Democrats* who are more favorably oriented toward expanded trade.[4]

The changing effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes can be shown graphically in Figure 1, in which we report predicted probabilities for support for expanded trade as a function of partisanship, holding other variables constant at their means. Clearly, there is a positive relationship between partisanship and support for expanded trade in 2011. Strong Democrats have the lowest predicted probability of support for increased trade (0.556), while strong Republicans have the highest predicted probability of support (0.669); this represents a shift of 0.113 across the range of the partisan identification variable, controlling for the effects of other variables. The story is very different in 2016 and 2017, with increases in partisanship in the Republican direction associated with *lower* levels of support for increased trade. Across the range of the partisan identification variable, there is a 0.092 decline (from 0.643 to 0.551) in support for increased trade in 2016 and a 0.095 decline (from 0.791 to 0.696) in 2017. It would appear that something happened between 2011 and 2016-2017 to shift the relationship between partisan identification and trade attitudes.

Donald Trump favorability and trade attitudes

One possibility is that the shift in the effects of partisanship on trade attitudes is linked to Americans' evaluations of Donald Trump. Given the strong anti-trade and economic nationalism rhetoric of Donald Trump both as a candidate and later as the President, it would not be surprising if Americans' trade attitudes are influenced by their attitudes toward Trump. In Table 2 we report multinomial logit estimates of support for expanded trade for 2016 and 2017, but in this case we add Trump favorability to our model.

[4] It is also worth noting—see Appendix Table A7—that in 2011 partisan identification is positively related to individuals reporting that they are unsure about trade (b = 0.075, z = 2.88), while the effects of partisan identification on unsure responses is statistically indistinguishable from 0 for in 2016 (b = -0.032, z = 1.22) and 2017 (b = -0.027, z = -0.69). Combined with the negative coefficients for the support trade responses, it appears that Republicans were considerably *less* likely to oppose expanded trade in 2011 than in 2016 and 2017.

Once again, we present the estimates only for the comparison of support for trade and opposition to trade; the full multinomial logit results are found in Appendix Table A8. If Americans' attitudes toward Trump affect the role of partisanship in shaping trade attitudes, we would expect Trump favorability to have a strong effect but that the effect of partisanship would be attenuated once we control for Trump favorability.

Our analyses generate results that are consistent with our expectations. First, Trump favorability has a strong negative effect on trade attitudes in both 2016 (b = -0.293, z = -6.72) and 2017 (b = -0.413, z = -5.87). Simply, those with favorable views toward Donald Trump were significantly less likely to support expanded trade in both 2016 and 2017, though overall support for expanded trade was higher in 2017 than in 2016.[5] This pattern can be shown in Figure 2, in which we graph the predicted probabilities for support for increased trade associated with different values of Trump favorability in 2016 and 2017, controlling for the effects of other independent variables. As one can see, in 2016 there is a discernible decrease in support for expanded trade as individuals increase their favorable attitudes toward Trump; those who have strong *unfavorable* views toward Trump are more likely to support increased trade (0.635) than those with strong *favorable* views toward Trump (0.552). Across the range of this variable there is a shift of 0.083 in the probability of supporting increased trade. A similar effect of Trump favorability on trade attitudes is observed in 2017; overall support for increased trade is higher in 2017 than in 2016, but the Trump favorability effect remains, with strong Trump *unfavorables* (0.800) more likely to support increased trade than strong Trump *favorables* (0.666) by a difference of 0.134. As expected, attitudes toward Trump shape Americans' attitudes toward international trade. The finding of cross-sectional Trump effects on trade attitudes reinforces the findings by Essig et al. (2021) in their cross-sectional analyses.

[5] We also find in Appendix Table A8 that Trump favorability is negatively related to unsure responses for both 2016 (b = -0.294; z = -6.05) and 2017 (b = -0.261, z = -3.31). Combined with the negative coefficients for the support trade responses, these results suggest that Trump supporters are less likely to give both unsure and support trade responses, meaning that oppose trade responses are significantly more likely to occur among Trump favorables than Trump unfavorables.

Second, the introduction of Donald Trump and his campaign for economic nationalism has shifted the partisan character of trade attitudes. While partisan identification has a significant (but variable) effect on trade attitudes in Table 1, the addition of the Trump favorability variable to our model reduces the coefficients for partisan identification to statistical non-significance (2016: b = 0.009, z = 0.34; 2017: b = -0.009, z = -0.23). Of course, Republicans are considerably more likely than Democrats to support Trump, and so Trump favorability and partisanship are strongly correlated. But we are struck here by how the Trump favorability variable so dominates partisan identification in shaping trade attitudes. These results provide circumstantial evidence that how Americans think of Trump affected the connection between partisan identification and trade attitudes. For 2016 and 2017, Trump evaluations overwhelm the effects of partisan identification on support for increased trade.

Trump favorability and *change* in trade attitudes

We now turn our attention to an exploration of *changes* in trade attitudes between 2011 and 2016. We have shown (see Appendix Table A2.1) that there has been a general shift toward more favorable attitudes about expanding trade since 2011, but we are also confronted with the finding that the effects of partisanship shifted considerably over that same time period. Relatively speaking, Republican identifiers were the champions of trade in 2011, but by 2016 that role had been taken over by Democratic identifiers. What explains this shift in how Republicans and Democrats think about international trade?

In Table 3 we present multinomial logit estimates for the Trump favorability variable in predicting each of the nine categories for *change* in trade attitudes from 2011-2016; for the sake of brevity, the full multinomial logit model results are reported in Appendix Table A9.[6] Each coefficient represents a binary comparison of being in the baseline category (i.e., oppose expanded trade in 2011 to oppose expanded trade in 2016). We also present predicted probabilities for being in each one of the nine change categories

[6] All independent variables are from the 2011 panel wave, with the exception of the Trump favorability variable, which is available only for 2016 wave.

that are associated with low and high values on the Trump favorability variable. In general, we find strong support for our arguments about the effects of Trump favorability on changes in trade attitudes. The coefficients for Trump favorability are positive and statistically significant for two change categories: (1) moving from unsure in 2011 to oppose in 2016 (b = 0.158, z = 1.68); and (2) moving from support in 2011 to oppose in 2016 (b = 1.77, z = 2.18). These results suggest that Trump supporters were more likely than Trump opponents to shift their trade attitudes from unsure/support to oppose from 2011-2016 than they were to be in the oppose-oppose category. On the other hand, for five of the change categories the effect of Trump favorability is negative, indicating that respondents were less likely to exhibit each of these patterns of change than they were to be in the baseline (oppose-oppose) category: (1) oppose to unsure (b = -1.72, z = -2.18); (2) oppose to support (b = -0.165, z - -2.05); (3) unsure to unsure (b = -0.212, z = -3.17);(4) unsure to support (b = -0.322, z = -4.56); and (5) support to support (b = -0.185, z = -3.35). The careful reader will note that these five categories all represent shifts that are either away from support for expanded trade or unchanging unsure or supportive positions. It would seem that Trump favorability has a positive effect on changes in trade attitudes that go against support for increased trade (i.e., moving from support-oppose or unsure-oppose) and a negative effect on changes in trade attitudes that move in favor of increased trade (i.e., oppose-unsure, oppose-support, unsure-unsure, unsure-support, and support-support).

In Table 3 we also report predicted probabilities for each combination of trade attitude changes, calculated for the low and high values on the Trump favorability variable, as well as differences in predicted probabilities across the range of Trump favorability. While the changes in predicted probabilities are relatively modest, there are two categories that generate a stronger negative effect of Trump favorability: (1) unsure to support (-0.047, from 0.114 to 0.067); and (2) support to support (-0.053, from 0.479 to 0.426. Each of these two categories represent movement in favor of support for increased trade or stable support for increased trade, and they are less likely to occur among Trump favorables than

Trump unfavorables. On the other hand, we find discernible increased probabilities associated with positive effects of Trump favorability for categories that represent movement toward opposition to increased trade: (1) oppose to oppose (0.033, from 0.059 to 0.092); (3) unsure to oppose (0.023, from 0.016 to 0.039); and (3) support to oppose (0.053, from 0.032 to 0.085). The bottom line is that Trump favorability is associated with shifts *away from* support for increased trade and shifts *toward* opposition to increased trade.

Party-specific effects of Trump favorability

Finally, we consider the degree to which Trump favorability has an effect on *changes* in trade attitudes among different partisan groups. In Table 4 we present multinomial logit coefficients for the effects of the Trump favorability variable on nine different patterns of change in support for trade from 2011 to 2016, estimated separately for Republicans, Independents, and Democrats; our full model estimates for each partisan group are presented in Appendix Table A10 (Republicans), Appendix Table A11 (Independents), and Appendix Table A12 (Democrats). We expect positive evaluations of Donald Trump to depress changes in support for expanded trade for all three partisan groups—simply, having a positive view of Trump should lead individuals of all political stripes to consider their trade attitudes and either move them toward Trump's professed views or at least prompt individuals to resist moving their trade attitudes in the positive direction.

This is what we find, at least for Republican and Democratic identifiers. Starting with Republicans, we find that Trump favorability has the effect of shifting individuals away from support for expanded trade and toward opposition to expanded trade. The multinomial logit coefficients are positive and statistically significant for two changes that move Republicans away from support for expanded trade: (1) unsure to oppose ($b = 0.339$, $z = 1.86$); and (2) support to oppose ($b = 0.339$, $z = 2.39$). Moreover, we observe negative coefficients for two other changes that move Republicans toward expanded trade: (1) unsure to support ($b = -0.281$, $z = -2.27$); and (2) support to support ($b = -0.179$, $z = -1.84$). Republicans are less likely

to move *toward* opposition to increased trade and are more likely to *move away from* support for increased trade.

For Democrats, the pattern of responsiveness to Trump favorability—and, conversely, Trump unfavorability—is at least as strong. All of the Trump favorability coefficients representing shifts away from support for increased trade are negative and statistically significant: (1) oppose to unsure (b = -0.395, z = -3.22); (2) oppose to support (b = -0.274, z = -2.38); (3) unsure to unsure (b = -0.294, z = -3.05); (4) unsure to support (b = -0.439, z = -4.08); and (5) support to support (b = -0.285, z = -3.55). Not only do these results suggest that Democratic Trump favorables are *more* likely to move away from support for expanded trade, but it also means that Democratic Trump unfavorables—a much larger group among Democrats—are *less* likely to move away from support for increased trade. Among Democrats, Trump unfavorables are *more* likely to move from oppose to unsure, oppose to support, and unsure to support, and they are more likely to remain in the unsure and support categories.

For independents, we find no effect of Trump favorability on the probability that individuals are found in any of the nine change categories. It would appear that Independent identifiers are unresponsive to Trump favorability as their trade attitudes shift from 2011 to 2016.

Republicans and Democrats are both responsive to Trump favorability in how they change their attitudes toward expanded trade from 2011 to 2016. If so, how can Trump favorability shift the effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes over this time period? It would be tempting to assume that because the effects of Trump favorability on changes in trade attitudes are similar for Democrats and Republicans, the effects of partisanship on trade attitudes should be invariant over time or, at least, not affected by Trump favorability.

We suggest that even with similar effects of Trump favorability on *changes* in trade attitudes for Republicans and Democrats, the overall relationship between partisanship and trade attitudes could have changed over time because of the partisan effects of Trump favorability. The key to this process is in

differences in the distributions of Trump favorability for Democrats and Republicans. Among Democrats, 85.2% of respondents report that they are very *unfavorable* in their evaluation of Donald Trump, and only 3.5% are very favorable and another 4.4% are favorable, for a total of 7.9% who are favorable in one way or another. This small number of Democrats who hold favorable views toward Trump are still likely to follow Trump rhetoric to shift their trade attitudes, but their numbers are dwarfed by the numbers of Democratic Trump unfavorables. Not unexpectedly, Republicans hold much more favorable evaluations of Trump, with 53.2% holding very favorable views and another 33.3% holding favorable views, for a total of 86.5% on the favorable side of the distribution of Trump evaluations; only 5.8% of Republicans hold very unfavorable views toward Donald Trump, another 7.7% hold unfavorable views, for a total of 13.5% on the unfavorable side of the scale.

Even though the negative effects of Trump favorability on changes in trade attitudes are similar for Democrats and Republicans, the high share of Republicans who hold favorable views toward Trump and the low share of Democrats who hold similarly favorable views toward Trump result in a different aggregate distribution of changes in trade attitudes for Republicans and Democrats. Given the distributions of Trump favorability for Republicans and Democrats, and given the observed relationship between Trump favorability and changes in trade attitudes from 2011 to 2016, we would expect (1) Republicans to have an overall distribution of changes in trade attitudes that tilts toward the anti-trade side, and (2) Democrats to have an overall distribution of changes in trade attitudes that tilts toward the pro-trade side. Indeed, this is exactly what we observe. The pattern of partisan distributions of Trump evaluations for Democrats and Republicans is entirely consistent with the observed pattern of pro-trade changes among Democrats and anti-trade (or, at least, less favorable to trade) changes among Republicans. Moreover, this pattern (and subsequent changes in trade attitudes for the two parties) is consistent with a scenario in which Republicans are more supportive of expanded trade in 2011 but that Democrats are more supportive of expanded trade in 2016. Hence the changing relationship between

partisan identification and trade attitudes appears to be linked to how different partisan groups evaluate Donald Trump. Simply, pro-Trump attitudes appear to have driven Republicans toward less favorable views toward expanded trade, while anti-Trump attitudes have shifted Democrats in a direction of more favorable attitudes toward expanded trade.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper is to explore possible explanations for shifts in Americans trade attitudes during the 2010s. We are guided by the hypothesis that individual-level shifts in trade attitudes over time are driven by Americans level of favorability toward Donald Trump. Specifically, we suggest that Americans with favorable views toward Donald Trump were influenced by Trump's anti-trade positions and shifted their trade attitudes in a negative (or less favorable) direction; on the other hand, we contend that Americans with unfavorable views toward Donald Trump used Trump's trade rhetoric and positions as a negative cue that led them to oppose Trump's anti-trade position. In order to gain the most leverage in understanding these changes, it is important to have panel data that includes the same trade questions in multiple waves. Fortunately, such data exist in the form of the Voter Study Group surveys, and we use data from the 2011, 2016, and 2017 waves not only to track changes in trade attitudes at the individual level but also to explore how the effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes underwent a major shift during this time frame. We can use data on Americans' evaluations of Donald Trump to explore the question of whether these evaluations were at least partly responsible for the shift in trade attitudes for Republicans and Democrats in the 2011-2016 time frame.

What have we learned? First, we show that Americans have shifted their support for expanded trade over time. Individuals have become much more supportive of expanded trade than during the first wave of the panel in 2011. From 2011-2016 the shift in trade attitudes at the individual level is quite modest, with those moving in the pro-trade direction slightly outnumbering those moving in the anti-trade direction. But from 2011 to 2017, the individual-level shift in the pro-trade direction became more pronounced.

Second, there was a substantial shift in the relationship between partisan identification and support for expanded trade. In 2011, the relationship was positive and statistically significant, but by both 2016 and 2017 the relationship between partisan identification and trade attitudes was negative and statistically significant. Clearly, something had happened to reverse the relationship between partisanship and how Americans think about trade.

Third, we find that the culprit for the flipped effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes is the emergence of a vocally anti-trade political leader, Donald Trump. In separate cross-sectional models, we find that having favorable views toward Donald Trump has a strong negative effect on support for expanded trade in both 2016 and 2017, with the coefficient for partisan identification reduced to statistical non-significance. Part of the reason for the non-significant effect of partisanship is that, controlling for Trump favorability, both Democrats and Republicans appear to be more supportive of expanded trade than political Independents.

Fourth, in order to isolate the relative effects of Trump favorability and partisan identification, we estimate a series of multinomial logit models in which different configurations of *changes* in trade attitudes from 2011-2016 are depicted as a function of Trump favorability, lagged partisanship, and a range of control variables. We find that changes in support for expanded trade are negatively affected by Trump favorability; simply, individuals with favorable views toward Donald Trump are the ones who shifted significantly in an anti-trade (or, at least, less favorable toward trade) direction relative to other respondents, while those with unfavorable views toward Donald Trump moved significantly in a pro-trade (or against the anti-trade) direction.

Finally, we show that the Trump favorability effect on *changes* in trade attitudes is roughly equivalent for both Republican and Democratic identifiers, but there is no Trump favorability effect for Independents. This suggests that both Republicans and Democrats who hold favorable (unfavorable) views toward Donald Trump shifted their support for expanded trade downward (upward) in comparison to others. It is

important to note that, even though the effect of Trump favorability is similar for Democrats and Republicans, the level of Trump favorability is quite different for these two partisan groups, with Republicans overwhelmingly supportive of Trump and only a small minority of Democrats holding the same favorable views. This suggests that in the aggregate the similar effects of Trump favorability for both Republicans and Democrats actually moves Republicans much more strongly away from the pro-trade direction compared to Democrats.

What are the implications of these findings? First, we are struck by the observation that the effects of partisan identification on Americans' preferences on trade are so ephemeral. The reasons that partisanship and trade attitudes are linked has traditionally been thought to be due to a greater tendency of Republicans to support free markets (including free *international* markets) and to support greater market activity, even if there is economic disruption in some domestic sectors. Over a relatively short time period this relationship has shifted, and the latest analyses suggest that it is Democrats who are more supportive of expanded trade. Second, our findings provide clear evidence that the changing relationship between partisan identification and trade attitudes is driven by a leadership effect, with (1) a transformative political figure (Donald Trump) staking out positions on trade that have traditionally not been associated with the mainstream of the Republican Party, followed by (2) individuals—both Republicans and Democrats—changing their trade attitudes over a very short period of time based on whether they have favorable views toward that transformative political figure. Our findings lend support for Lenz' (2012) arguments that elite discourse can cause a shift in how Americans think about highly-charged political issues.

Where do we go from here? The research agenda on changes in trade attitudes is a full one. First, it is reasonable to ask if changes in how Americans think about trade is a function, at least in part, of contextual variables that define the economic and cultural circumstances under which individuals live. For instance, are Americans who reside in states or counties with high unemployment most susceptible to the

anti-trade rhetoric of Donald Trump? What is the effect of job losses due to trade on whether Americans shifted their trade attitudes (cf., Lukinovich, Nurullayev, and Garand 2021)? Does the trade dependence of state and county economies shape changes in Americans' trade attitudes? Second, does Trump favorability interact with other attitudes to magnify or mute changes in how Americans think about trade? For instance, are individuals who have favorable views toward Trump and who express concerns about the state of the economy more likely to change their trade attitudes over time? Finally, we suggest that more research is needed on other aspects of trade attitudes. In this paper we focus our attention on attitudes toward expanded trade. But what about attitudes toward *free* trade? Understandably, the VSG panel does not include variables measured at different times relating to free trade in general or free trade agreements with other countries. Would the Trump effect possibly be even stronger for Americans' attitudes toward free trade? Moreover, what about Americans' attitudes toward tariffs? It would be highly useful to estimate the Trump effect on how Americans think about tariffs. Did previously anti-tariff Republicans shift their position over time as a function of Trump favorability?

Figure 1. Predicted probabilities for relationship between partisan identification and support for increased trade, 2011, 2016, and 2017, Voter Study Group survey



Note: These predicted probabilities are based on the multinomial logit results reported in Table 1. These results represent predicted probabilities of support for increased trade; for the sake of brevity and presentational simplicity, we do not report predicted probabilities for responses representing opposition to increased trade and unsure responses. The thin dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around the predicted probability associated with each value of partisan identification.

Figure 2. Predicted probabilities for relationship between Trump favorability and support for increased trade, 2016 and 2017, Voter Study Group survey



Note: These predicted probabilities are based on the multinomial logit results reported in Table 2. These results represent predicted probabilities of support for increased trade; for the sake of brevity and presentational simplicity, we do not report predicted probabilities for responses representing opposition to increased trade and unsure responses. The thin dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around the predicted probability associated with each value of Trump favorability.

Table 1. Multinomial logit coefficients for changing effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes, 2011, 2016, and 2017, Voter Study Group Survey

	Comparing support for trade (2) vs. (baseline) opposition to trade (0)					
	2011		2016		2017	
Variable	b	z	b	z	b	z
Partisan identification	0.122	5.29***	-0.083	-3.53***	-0.103	-2.94**
Political ideology	-0.035	-0.76	-0.011	-0.24	-0.285	-4.22***
Retrospective personal economic evaluations	-0.023	-0.38	0.167	2.58**	0.210	2.08*
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations	0.602	10.13***	0.532	9.31***	0.556	6.15***
Education	0.209	7.82***	0.195	7.02***	0.224	5.43***
Family income	0.067	5.30***	0.034	2.66**	0.063	3.32***
Gender	-0.737	-10.21***	-0.645	-8.57***	-0.553	-4.90***
Black	-0.086	-0.65	-0.169	-1.20	-0.264	-1.27
Hispanic	0.163	0.97	0.079	0.45	0.259	0.92
Asian	0.493	1.39	0.336	0.91	-0.451	-1.07
Intercept	-0.183	-1.23	0.487	3.27***	1.524	7.08***
N	6308		6319		4579	
Pseudo R^2	0.067		0.059		0.071	
Likelihood ratio χ^2	802.57		710.83		498.13	
Prob(χ^2)	0.000		0.000		0.000	

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: these results are generated using multinomial logit analysis for a three-point scale, coded 2 for support for increased trade, 1 for unsure responses, and 0 for opposition to increased trade. For the sake of brevity and presentational simplicity, we report the results only for the comparison of supporters and opponents (baseline) of increased trade. The full results including comparison with unsure respondents is found in Appendix Table A7.

Table 2. Multinomial logit estimates of effects of Trump favorability on Americans' trade attitudes, 2016 and 2017, Voter Study Group Survey

	Comparing support for trade (2) vs. (baseline) opposition to trade (0)			
	2016		2017	
Variable	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability	-0.293	-6.72***	-0.413	-5.87***
Partisan identification	0.009	0.34	0.009	0.23
Political ideology	0.064	1.30	-0.180	-2.56**
Retrospective personal economic evaluations	0.123	1.86*	0.198	1.96*
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations	0.516	8.92***	0.750	7.77***
Education	0.180	6.36***	0.199	4.77***
Family income	0.039	3.01***	0.061	3.18***
Gender	-0.676	-8.85***	-0.581	-5.09***
Black	-0.190	-1.32	-0.385	-1.84*
Hispanic	0.051	0.29	0.224	0.79
Asian	0.291	0.79	-0.526	-1.23
Intercept	0.550	3.61***	1.428	6.55***
N	6212		4526	
Pseudo R^2	0.064		0.076	
Likelihood ratio χ^2	755.84		524.60	
Prob(χ^2)	0.000		0.000	

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: these results are generated using multinomial logit analysis for a three-point scale, coded 2 for support for increased trade, 1 for unsure responses, and 0 for opposition to increased trade. For the sake of brevity and presentational simplicity, we report the results only for the comparison of supporters and opponents (baseline) of increased trade. The full results including comparison with unsure respondents is found in Appendix Table A8.

Table 3. Multinomial logit estimates for models of change in trade attitudes, Trump favorability coefficients, 2011-2016, Voter Study Group Survey

Change configuration		b	z	Trump favorability		
				Low	High	Difference
0	Baseline: Oppose to oppose	---	---	0.059	0.092	0.033
1	Oppose to unsure [-]					
	Trump favorability	-0.172	-2.18*	0.045	0.042	-0.003
2	Oppose to support [-]					
	Trump favorability	-0.165	-2.05*	0.052	0.049	-0.003
3	Unsure to oppose [+]					
	Trump favorability	0.158	1.68*	0.016	0.039	0.023
4	Unsure to unsure [-]					
	Trump favorability	-0.212	-3.17***	0.103	0.085	0.018
5	Unsure to support [-]					
	Trump favorability	-0.322	-4.56***	0.114	0.067	-0.047
6	Support to oppose [+]					
	Trump favorability	0.177	2.18*	0.032	0.085	0.053
7	Support to unsure [+]					
	Trump favorability	-0.098	-1.44	0.099	0.114	0.015
8	Support to support [-]					
	Trump favorability	-0.185	-3.35***	0.479	0.426	-0.053

N	6171
Pseudo R^2	0.054
Likelihood ratio χ^2	1193.19
Prob(χ^2)	0.000

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: We report here estimates for the Trump favorability variable from our multinomial logit model of changes in support for trade from 2011 to 2016. Our dependent variable is a nine-point nominal scale representing each pairing of values for the trade attitudes variables from 2011 and 2016. We also present predicted probabilities for the lowest (0) and highest (3) values on the Trump favorability variable, controlling for the effects of other independent variables in the model. The coefficients for other independent variables are not reported for the sake of brevity and presentational clarity; the full multinomial logit results are found in Appendix Table A9.

Table 4. Multinomial logit estimates for models of change in trade attitudes, Trump favorability coefficients, by partisan identification, 2011-2016, Voter Study Group Survey

		Republicans		Independents		Democrats	
		b	z	b	z	b	z
0	Baseline: Oppose to oppose						
1	Oppose to unsure [-]						
	Trump favorability	-0.152	-1.12	0.273	1.52	-0.395	-3.22***
2	Oppose to support [-]						
	Trump favorability	-0.071	-0.47	0.030	0.17	-0.274	-2.38**
3	Unsure to oppose [+]						
	Trump favorability	0.339	1.86*	0.355	1.63	0.029	0.22
4	Unsure to unsure [-]						
	Trump favorability	-0.161	-1.37	0.025	0.17	-0.294	-3.05***
5	Unsure to support [-]						
	Trump favorability	-0.281	-2.27*	-0.031	-0.20	-0.439	-4.08***
6	Support to oppose [+]						
	Trump favorability	0.339	2.39**	0.161	0.83	0.080	0.67
7	Support to unsure [+]						
	Trump favorability	-0.037	-0.33	0.024	0.16	-0.190	-1.85
8	Support to support [-]						
	Trump favorability	-0.179	-1.84*	-0.012	-0.10	-0.285	-3.55***
N		2495		766		2907	
Pseudo R^2		0.062		0.068		0.057	
Likelihood ratio χ^2		547.07		190.54		583.29	
Prob(χ^2)		0.000		0.000		0.000	

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: We report here estimates for the Trump favorability variable from our multinomial logit model of changes in support for trade from 2011 to 2016. Our dependent variable is a nine-point nominal scale representing each pairing of values for the trade attitudes variables from 2011 and 2016. The coefficients for other independent variables are not reported for the sake of brevity and presentational clarity; the full multinomial logit results are found in Appendix Tables A10 (Republicans), A11 (Independents), and A12 (Democrats).

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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Appendix 1. Description of Voter Study Group Panel Data

The Cooperative Campaigns Analysis Project (CCAP) conducted an original national survey with 45,000 respondents in December 2011 through the online firm YouGov, with a follow-up interview sometime between January and November of 2012. The Voter Study Group then chose 11,168 respondents from the 2012 CCAP survey for a third interview in 2016, with 8,637 (77%) completing this third wave. A fourth panel wave with 5,000 respondent was collected in July 2017 and a fifth panel wave of 4,705 respondents was collected in May 2018, though these 2018 respondents are not included in the present study. We use respondents who completed the 2011, 2016, and 2017 waves of the survey as our sample for this study.

The Voter Study Group, funded by Washington D.C.-based think tank the Ethics and Public Policy Center, also used YouGov to interview respondents for the 2016 survey. The online surveying service uses a sample matching procedure to select respondents by choosing survey-takers that resemble a synthetic sampling frame created by YouGov. Based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and other sources, the site creates a model representative sample of the U.S. population, then selects respondents from those who have agreed to take the survey that match specific demographic characteristics. The data are finally weighted by demographic and non-demographic variables.

We note that the 2018 VSG survey includes data from all previous waves, and we use the 2017 and 2018 variables from the 2018 VSG survey to merge with data from the 2011, 2012, and 2016 waves. Additional respondents who were re-interviewed in 2017 are included in the 2018 version of the panel dataset, so the number of panel respondents for 2017 now exceeds 6100 respondents. Hence the sample sizes for our models exceed the 5000 panel respondents originally included in the 2017 survey.

Appendix Table A2.1. Distribution of attitudes toward expanding trade, 2011, 2016, and 2017 Voter Study Group surveys.

	2011		2016		2017	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Decrease trade	18.4%	(1,461)	15.8%	(1,260)	8.5%	(506)
Unsure	24.9%	(1,975)	27.5%	(2,190)	21.5%	(1,279)
Increase trade	56.7%	(4,502)	56.7%	(4,509)	70.1%	(4,178)
Total N		(7,938)		(7,959)		(5,963)

Appendix 3. Descriptive patterns of change in trade attitudes, 2011-2016 and 2011-2017

How does the distribution of attitudes toward expanded trade vary over time? In Appendix Table A3.1 we present the frequencies for changes in trade attitudes for the 2011-2016 and 2011-2017 time periods. From 2011 to 2016, there is a small increase in pro-trade sentiment; 19.6% of respondents increase their support for trade, while 17.5% decrease their support. The mean on this variable is 0.024, meaning that the distribution of this variable is slightly tilted in the positive direction. On the other hand, there is a substantial increase in pro-trade sentiment between 2016 and 2017. For the 2011-2017 period, 28.5% of respondents moved in a pro-trade direction, compared to only 9.1% of respondents who moved in an anti-trade direction. Moreover, the mean for the 2011-2017 change variable is 0.235, indicating that the distribution for this variable is more heavily tilted in the pro-trade direction.

Patterns of individual-level changes in trade attitudes since 2011

We begin by presenting a simple description of patterns of change in trade attitudes from the starting point of the VSG panel dataset. As noted, in 2011 a majority (56.7%) of Americans were in favor of increased trade, and less than one in five (18.4%) were opposed to expanded trade. However, as shown in Appendix Table A3.2, there was some movement in trade attitudes between 2011 and 2016. Among those who opposed increased trade in 2011, only 43.7% held that same position in 2016, and 27.2% of them shifted to a position of supporting increased trade. On the other hand, among those who supported increased trade in 2011, 74.7% maintained that position while only 8.1% shifted to oppose increased trade in 2016, though another 17.2% moved from supporting expanded trade to “unsure” in 2016. Among individuals who were unsure in 2011, 50% remained unsure in 2016, but the new supporters of increased trade (37.2%) outnumbered new opponents (12.8%). Clearly there was some churning in attitudes toward expanded trade between 2011 and 2016.

Between 2011 and 2017, there was a substantial increase in support for expanded trade, meaning that there was a large shift that occurred between 2016 and 2017. Using 2011 as the base, in Appendix Table A3.3 we see that only one-third (33.7%) of those opposed to increased trade in 2011 maintained that position in 2017, with 41.4% moving from opposition to increased trade in 2011 to support for increased trade in 2017. This increase in support for expanded trade among the previously opposed was not accompanied by a compensatory change among 2011 supporters of expanded trade; fully 88.8% of 2011 supporters of expanded trade held the same view in 2017, and only 3.0% of 2011 trade supporters shifted to opposition in 2017. Despite Trump’s best efforts, on balance something happened between 2016 and 2017 to lead Americans to increase their support for expanded trade.

Appendix Table A3.1. Contingency table of 2011 and 2016 trade attitudes, Voter Study Group Survey

	2016 Trade Attitudes			
	Opposed	Unsure	Supports	Total
2011 Trade Attitudes				
Opposed	43.7% (636)	29.0% (422)	27.2% (396)	100% (1,454)
Unsure	12.8% (251)	50.0% (980)	37.2% (729)	100% (1,960)
Supports	8.1% (364)	17.2% (770)	74.7% (3,354)	100% (4,488)
Total	15.8% (1,251)	27.5% (2,172)	56.7% (4,479)	100% (7,902)

$\Upsilon = 0.608$
$Z_{\Upsilon} = 50.65^{***}$

Appendix Table A3.2. Contingency table of 2011 and 2017 trade attitudes, Voter Study Group Survey

	2017 Trade Attitudes			
	Opposed	Unsure	Supports	Total
2011 Trade Attitudes				
Opposed	33.7% (311)	24.9% (230)	41.4% (382)	100% (923)
Unsure	5.7% (93)	46.2% (757)	48.2% (790)	100% (1,640)
Supports	3.0% (99)	8.2% (275)	88.8% (2,973)	100& (3,347)
Total	8.5% (503)	21.4% (1,262)	70.1% (4,145)	100% (5,910)

$\Upsilon = 0.644$
$Z_{\Upsilon} = 45.98***$

Appendix 4. Control variables

We also include a range of control variables in our models. First, we include liberal-conservative ideology, measured as a five-point scale ranging from 0 (strong liberal) to 4 (strong conservative). We expect that conservatives should be more supportive of expanded trade, so the coefficient for this variable should be positive. Second, how Americans think about their personal economic situation and the national economy can have an effect on how they think about trade, with Americans who perceive themselves or the national economy in a more vulnerable position less likely to support expanded trade. We measure retrospective personal economic evaluations on a three-point scale, coded 0 for respondents who perceive that they are worse off economically than last year, 1 for those who perceive that their economic situation is the same as last year, and 2 for those who perceive that they are better off than last year. We also measure prospective sociotropic economic evaluations, ranging from 0 (for respondents who perceive that the economy is getting worse) to 2 (for respondents who perceive that the economy is getting better). We hypothesize that both variables will be positively related to support for expanded trade, indicating that economically-content individuals are supportive of increased trade but that economically-vulnerable individuals are less supportive.

We also include several demographic and socioeconomic variables: (1) education, measured on a six-point scale ranging from 0 (less than high school completed) to 5 (post-graduate degree); (2) family income, measured on 12-point scale in 2011 ranging from 0 (less than $10K per year) to 11 (more than $150K per year) and on a 16-point scale in 2016 and 2017 ranging from 0 (less than $10K per year) to 15 (income greater than $500K per year); (3) gender, coded 1 for women, and 0 for men; (4) black racial self-identification, coded 1 for black respondents, and 0 for other respondents; (5) Hispanic ethnic self-identification, coded 1 for Hispanic respondents, and 0 otherwise; and (6) Asian racial self-identification, coded 1 Asian respondents, and 0 otherwise. We expect that education and family income will be positively related to support for expanded trade, though we expect that women, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians will be less supportive of expanded trade. The effects of these variables on *changes* in trade attitudes is less certain, though we expect that highly-educated respondents will be more certain about their trade attitudes and hence will be less likely to exhibit change in trade attitudes over time.

Appendix Table A5. Description of variables

Variable	Description
Support for expanded trade	Based on response to question: "Do you favor or oppose increasing trade with other nations?" 2 = respondent favors increased trade; 1 = respondent is unsure; 0 = respondent opposes increased trade. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Change in support for increased trade	Based on the cross-tabulation of 2011 trade attitudes on 2016 trade attitudes, there are nine combinations of changes in trade attitudes. We create a nominal (non-orderable discrete) scale, coded as follows: 0 = oppose (2011) to oppose (2016); 1 = oppose (2011) to unsure (2016); 2 = oppose (2011) to support (2016); 3 = unsure (2011) to oppose (2016); 4 = unsure (2011) to unsure (2016); 5 = unsure (2011) to support (2016); 6 = support (2011) to oppose (2016); 7 = support (2011) to unsure (2016); and 8 = support (2011) to support (2016)
Partisan identification	Partisan identification scale, ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican). This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Republican party strength	Strength of Republican partisanship scale: 3 = respondent is a strong Republican; . . . ; 0 = R is an Independent or Democrat. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Democratic party strength	Strength of Democratic partisanship scale: 3 = respondent is a strong Democrat; . . . ; 0 = R is an Independent or Republican. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Trump favorability	Scale of favorable attitudes toward Donald Trump, ranging from 0 (very unfavorable to Trump) to 3 (very favorable to Trump). This variable is measured in 2016 and 2017.
Political ideology	Liberal-conservative ideology scale, ranging from 0 (strong liberal) to 4 (strong conservative). This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Retrospective personal economic evaluations	2 = respondent is better off financially in last year; 1 = respondent is about the same financially as now; 0 = respondent is worse off financially in last year. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations	2 = respondent perceives national economy as getting better; 1 = respondent perceives national economy as being about the same; 0 = respondent perceives national economy as getting worse. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.

Appendix Table A5 (continued)

Variable	Description
Education	Educational attainment, ranging from 0 (no high school diploma) to 5 (post-graduate degree). This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Household income	Household income, ranging from 0 (less than $10K per year) to 11 (greater than $150K per year). This variable is measured in using this scale in 2011. Household income, ranging from 0 (less than $10K per year) to 15 (greater than $500K per year). This variable is measured using this scale in 2016 and 2017.
Gender	1 = respondent is a woman; 0 = respondent is a man. This variable is measured in 2016 but is assumed not to change over time .
Black	1 = respondent is black; 0 = otherwise. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Hispanic	1 = respondent is Hispanic; 0 = otherwise. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.
Asian	1 = respondent is Asian; 0 = otherwise. This variable is measured in 2011, 2016, and 2017.

Appendix Table A6. Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min.	Max.
Dependent variables					
Support for expanded trade (2011)	6,283	1.415	0.778	0	2
Support for expanded trade (2016)	6,283	1.427	0.751	0	2
Support for expanded trade (2017)	4,659	1.641	0.630	0	2
Independent variables					
Partisan identification (2011)	6,283	2.798	2.209	0	6
Partisan identification (2016)	6,260	2.785	2.223	0	6
Partisan identification (2017)	4,643	2.846	2.207	0	6
Republican (2011)	6,283	0.405	0.491	0	1
Republican 2016)	6,260	0.402	0.490	0	1
Republican (2017)	5,871	0.399	0.490	0	1
Democrat (2011)	6,283	0.471	0.499	0	1
Democrat (2016)	6,260	0.461	0.499	0	1
Democrat (2017)	5,871	0.440	0.496	0	1
Trump favorability (2016)	6,168	1.254	1.282	0	3
Trump favorability (2017)	4,703	1.241	1.312	0	3
Political ideology (2011)	6,283	2.168	1.071	0	4
Political ideology (2016)	6,216	2.135	1.101	0	4
Political ideology (2017)	4,707	2.146	1.119	0	4
Retrospective personal economic evaluations (2011)	6,283	0.717	0.680	0	2
Retrospective personal economic evaluations (2016)	6,240	0.876	0.646	0	2
Retrospective personal economic evaluations (2017)	4,672	0.980	0.605	0	2
Prospective national economic evaluations (2011)	6,283	0.874	0.779	0	2
Prospective national economic evaluations (2016)	5,997	1.075	0.733	0	2
Prospective national economic evaluations (2017)	4,492	1.198	0.716	0	2
Education (2011)	6,283	2.788	1.480	0	5
Education (2016)	6,283	2.868	1.484	0	5
Education (2017)	4,771	2.923	1.489	0	5
Household income (2011)	6,283	5.645	3.152	0	11
Household income (2016)	5,905	5.950	3.326	0	15
Household income (2017)	4,403	6.014	3.378	0	15
Gender	6,283	0.488	0.500	0	1
Black (2011)	6,283	0.082	0.274	0	1
Black (2016)	6,283	0.082	0.274	0	1
Black (2017)	6,134	0.079	0.270	0	1
Hispanic (2011)	6,283	0.050	0.217	0	1
Hispanic (2016)	6,283	0.049	0.217	0	1
Hispanic (2017)	6,134	0.049	0.215	0	1
Asian (2011)	6,283	0.014	0.119	0	1
Asian (2016)	6,283	0.015	0.120	0	1
Asian (2017)	6,134	0.017	0.129	0	1

Appendix Table A7. Full multinomial logit coefficients for changing effects of partisan identification on trade attitudes, 2011, 2016, and 2017, Voter Study Group Survey

	Trade attitudes (2011)				Trade attitudes (2016)			
	Unsure (1) vs. Oppose (0)		Support (2) vs. Oppose (0)		Unsure (1) vs. Oppose (0)		Support (2) vs. Oppose (0)	
Variable	b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Partisan identification	0.075	2.88**	0.122	5.29***	-0.032	-1.22	-0.083	-3.53***
Political ideology	-0.177	-3.41***	-0.035	-0.76	-0.011	-0.22	-0.011	-0.24
Retrospective personal economic evaluations	-0.006	-0.08	-0.023	-0.38	0.061	0.85	0.167	2.58
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations	0.342	5.10***	0.602	10.13***	0.363	5.72***	0.532	9.31***
Education	0.065	2.11*	0.209	7.82***	0.073	2.36**	0.195	7.02***
Family income	0.020	1.39	0.067	5.30***	0.011	0.81	0.034	2.66**
Gender	0.356	4.18***	-0.737	-10.21***	0.411	4.85***	-0.645	-8.57***
Black	-0.149	-1.00	-0.086	-0.65	-0.311	-1.95	-0.169	-1.20
Hispanic	0.024	0.12	0.163	0.97	0.036	0.19	0.079	0.45
Asian	0.342	0.87	0.493	1.39	0.227	0.56	0.336	0.91
Intercept	-0.376	-2.24*	-0.183	-1.23	-0.290	-1.74	0.487	3.27***
N	6308				6319			
Pseudo R^2	0.067				0.059			
Likelihood ratio χ^2	802.57				710.83			
Prob(χ^2)	0.000				0.000			

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Appendix Table A7 (continued)

	Trade attitudes (2017)			
	Unsure (1) vs. Oppose (0)		Support (2) vs. Oppose (0)	
Variable	b	z	b	z
Partisan identification	-0.027	-0.69	-0.103	-2.94**
Political ideology	-0.172	-2.29*	-0.285	-4.22***
Retrospective personal economic evaluations	0.163	1.45	0.210	2.08*
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations	0.331	3.27***	0.556	6.15***
Education	0.037	0.80	0.224	5.43***
Family income	0.027	1.26	0.063	3.32***
Gender	0.543	4.20***	-0.553	-4.90***
Black	-0.071	-0.31	-0.264	-1.27
Hispanic	0.151	0.48	0.259	0.92
Asian	-0.349	-0.72	-0.451	-1.07
Intercept	0.179	0.73	1.524	7.08***
N	4579			
Pseudo R2	0.071			
Likelihood ratio $\chi 2$	498.13			
Prob($\chi 2$)	0.000			

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Appendix Table A8. Full multinomial logit coefficients for changing effects of Trump favorability on trade attitudes, 2016 and 2017, Voter Study Group Survey

	Trade attitudes (2016)				Trade attitudes (2017)			
	Unsure (1) vs. Oppose (0)		Support (2) vs. Oppose (0)		Unsure (1) vs. Oppose (0)		Support (2) vs. Oppose (0)	
Variable	b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability	-0.294	-6.05***	-0.293	-6.72***	-0.261	-3.31***	-0.413	-5.87***
Partisan identification	0.058	1.92	0.009	0.34	0.039	0.88	0.009	0.23
Political ideology	0.067	1.24	0.064	1.30	-0.103	-1.31	-0.180	-2.56**
Retrospective personal economic evaluations	0.017	0.23	0.123	1.86	0.154	1.36	0.198	1.96*
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations	0.347	5.40***	0.516	8.92***	0.453	4.21***	0.750	7.77***
Education	0.054	1.72	0.180	6.36***	0.019	0.41	0.199	4.77***
Family income	0.019	1.31	0.039	3.01***	0.028	1.31	0.061	3.18***
Gender	0.382	4.44***	-0.676	-8.85***	0.510	3.91***	-0.581	-5.09***
Black	-0.320	-1.96*	-0.190	-1.32	-0.158	-0.68	-0.385	-1.84
Hispanic	0.024	0.12	0.051	0.29	0.102	0.32	0.224	0.79
Asian	0.137	0.33	0.291	0.79	-0.341	-0.70	-0.526	-1.23
Intercept	-0.246	-1.44	0.550	3.61***	0.125	0.51	1.428	6.55***
N		6212				4526		
Pseudo R2		0.064				0.076		
Likelihood ratio $\chi 2$		755.84				524.60		
Prob($\chi 2$)		0.000				0.000		

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Appendix Table A9. Full multinomial logit coefficients for effects of Trump favorability on changes in trade attitudes, 2011-2016, Voter Study Group Survey

	Baseline (0):	1		2		3		4	
2011:	Oppose	Oppose to		Oppose to		Unsure to		Unsure to	
2016:	Oppose	Unsure		Support		Oppose		Unsure	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		-0.172	-2.18*	-0.165	-2.05*	0.158	1.68*	-0.212	-3.17***
Partisan identification		0.072	1.45	0.013	0.26	0.112	1.90	0.135	3.22***
Political ideology		0.008	0.09	0.028	0.28	-0.223	-1.92	-0.115	-1.43
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		0.235	1.89	0.085	0.67	0.076	0.51	0.073	0.70
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		-0.014	-0.11	0.259	2.05*	0.309	2.03*	0.433	4.11***
Education		0.003	0.06	0.081	1.44	-0.010	-0.14	0.080	1.69
Family income		0.023	0.86	0.016	0.60	0.031	0.96	0.006	0.28
Gender		0.629	3.93***	-0.505	-3.34***	0.268	1.47	0.598	4.55***
Black		0.114	0.40	0.311	1.16	0.087	0.24	-0.100	-0.42
Hispanic		0.200	0.58	-0.081	-0.22	-0.114	-0.26	0.112	0.38
Asian		-0.068	-0.07	0.689	0.89	-12.849	-0.02	0.625	0.93
Intercept		-1.136	-3.65***	-0.631	-2.06*	-1.611	-4.34***	-0.567	-2.20*

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Appendix Table A9 (continued)

	Baseline (0):	5		6		7		8	
2011:	Oppose	Unsure to		Support to		Support to		Support to	
2016:	Oppose	Support		Oppose		Unsure		Support	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		-0.322	-4.56***	0.177	2.18*	-0.098	-1.44	-0.185	-3.35***
Partisan identification		0.125	2.85**	0.175	3.43***	0.148	3.48***	0.158	4.55***
Political ideology		-0.142	-1.70	-0.145	-1.46	0.034	0.41	-0.011	-0.16
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		0.064	0.59	0.147	1.17	-0.024	-0.23	0.067	0.76
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		0.389	3.60***	0.331	2.55**	0.570	5.30***	0.742	8.29***
Education		0.121	2.49**	0.147	2.61**	0.198	4.17***	0.254	6.45***
Family income		0.059	2.59**	0.042	1.59	0.061	2.72**	0.087	4.70***
Gender		0.099	0.75	-0.329	-2.19*	-0.145	-1.15	-0.925	-8.82***
Black		-0.042	-0.17	0.538	1.84	-0.183	-0.70	0.025	0.12
Hispanic		0.148	0.49	0.588	1.85	0.151	0.51	0.166	0.67
Asian		0.915	1.38	1.097	1.48	0.839	1.26	0.770	1.26
Intercept		-0.576	-2.18*	-1.794	-5.60***	-1.354	-5.08***	0.112	0.52
N		6171							
Pseudo R^2		0.054							
Likelihood ratio χ^2		1193.19							
Prob(χ^2)		0.000							

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: The (excluded) baseline category is opposed (2011) to opposed (2016)—i.e., individuals who were opposed to expanded trade in 2011 and continued to hold that position in 2016.

Appendix Table A10. Full multinomial logit coefficients for effects of Trump favorability on *changes* in trade attitudes, Republican identifiers, 2011-2016, Voter Study Group Survey

	Baseline (0):	1		2		3		4	
2011:	Oppose	Oppose to		Oppose to		Unsure to		Unsure to	
2016:	Oppose	Unsure		Support		Oppose		Unsure	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		-0.152	-1.12	-0.071	-0.47	0.339	1.86*	-0.161	-1.37
Republican Intensity		-0.327	-2.20*	-0.118	-0.76	-0.286	-1.72	-0.098	-0.75
Democratic intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Political ideology		0.284	1.64	0.040	0.22	0.317	1.58	0.295	1.97*
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		0.396	1.99*	-0.035	-0.16	0.177	0.77	0.056	0.31
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		-0.161	-0.69	-0.114	-0.46	0.266	1.04	0.180	0.92
Education		-0.107	-1.18	-0.022	-0.24	-0.127	-1.22	0.053	0.69
Family income		0.039	0.89	0.078	1.72	0.052	1.06	0.011	0.29
Gender		0.941	3.66***	-0.597	-2.36**	0.504	1.84	0.628	2.97**
Black		1.052	0.85	1.451	1.17	-12.626	-0.02	1.091	0.97
Hispanic		-0.985	-1.49	-0.799	-1.21	-0.623	-0.94	-0.680	-1.39
Asian		0.331	0.23	-13.591	-0.01	-13.119	-0.01	-0.347	-0.24
Intercept		-0.959	-1.40	-0.412	-0.56	-2.487	-2.95**	-0.870	-1.47

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Appendix Table A10 (continued)

	Baseline (0):	5		6		7		8	
2011:	Oppose	Unsure to		Support to		Support to		Support to	
2016:	Oppose	Support		Oppose		Unsure		Support	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		-0.281	-2.27*	0.339	2.39**	-0.037	-0.33	-0.179	-1.84*
Republican Intensity		0.055	0.39	-0.141	-1.05	-0.189	-1.57	-0.051	-0.49
Democratic intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Political ideology		0.177	1.10	0.009	0.06	0.257	1.80	0.169	1.40
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		-0.028	-0.14	0.212	1.14	-0.007	-0.04	0.045	0.31
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		0.073	0.35	-0.074	-0.35	0.304	1.66	0.253	1.60
Education		0.106	1.30	0.200	2.49**	0.171	2.38**	0.218	3.56***
Family income		0.087	2.21*	0.064	1.64	0.087	2.51**	0.109	3.68***
Gender		0.056	0.26	-0.709	-3.26***	-0.342	-1.78	-1.296	-7.87***
Black		1.207	1.03	1.353	1.16	0.619	0.53	1.152	1.10
Hispanic		-0.469	-0.95	0.083	0.19	-0.367	-0.88	-0.329	-0.96
Asian		0.513	0.41	0.814	0.65	-13.905	-0.02	0.478	0.44
Intercept		-1.046	-1.66	-1.357	-2.05*	-0.833	-1.47	0.874	1.84

N	2495
Pseudo R2	0.062
Likelihood ratio χ2	547.07
Prob(χ2)	0.000

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: The (excluded) baseline category is opposed (2011) to opposed (2016)—i.e., individuals who were opposed to expanded trade in 2011 and continued to hold that position in 2016.

Appendix Table A11. Full multinomial logit coefficients for effects of Trump favorability on changes in trade attitudes, Independent identifiers, 2011-2016, Voter Study Group Survey

	Baseline (0):	1		2		3		4	
2011:	Oppose	Oppose to		Oppose to		Unsure to		Unsure to	
2016:	Oppose	Unsure		Support		Oppose		Unsure	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		0.273	1.52	0.030	0.17	0.355	1.63	0.025	0.17
Republican Intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Democratic intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Political ideology		-0.547	-2.09*	0.057	0.21	-0.609	-1.93	-0.495	-2.23*
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		-0.154	-0.38	0.310	0.85	0.136	0.29	0.114	0.37
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		-0.035	-0.09	0.154	0.44	-0.020	-0.05	0.316	1.11
Education		-0.263	-1.55	0.107	0.69	-0.010	-0.05	0.070	0.54
Family income		0.031	0.44	0.007	0.11	-0.043	-0.51	-0.012	-0.21
Gender		0.083	0.21	-0.151	-0.38	0.278	0.57	0.422	1.25
Black		1.619	1.68	0.685	0.66	0.720	0.56	1.069	1.25
Hispanic		1.993	1.69	0.790	0.55	1.309	0.91	1.731	1.55
Asian		-12.563	-0.02	0.761	0.53	-12.872	-0.01	-0.154	-0.11
Intercept		0.328	0.37	-1.453	-1.58	-0.474	-0.45	0.303	0.42

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Appendix Table A11 (continued)

	Baseline (0):	5		6		7		8	
2011:	Oppose	Unsure to		Support to		Support to		Support to	
2016:	Oppose	Support		Oppose		Unsure		Support	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		-0.031	-0.20	0.161	0.83	0.024	0.16	-0.012	-0.10
Republican Intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Democratic intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Political ideology		-0.451	-1.98*	-0.301	-1.04	-0.017	-0.08	-0.085	-0.48
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		0.357	1.18	0.472	1.23	0.034	0.11	0.272	1.11
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		0.220	0.77	0.063	0.17	0.677	2.44**	0.521	2.25*
Education		0.122	0.95	0.034	0.20	0.303	2.41**	0.251	2.48**
Family income		0.013	0.22	0.034	0.46	-0.014	-0.25	0.102	2.25*
Gender		-0.001	0.00	0.455	1.03	-0.170	-0.52	-0.977	-3.64***
Black		-0.796	-0.64	1.002	0.95	-0.871	-0.70	0.691	0.88
Hispanic		1.119	0.96	1.737	1.39	1.988	1.83	1.595	1.53
Asian		-13.263	-0.02	1.557	1.24	0.611	0.49	0.061	0.05
Intercept		0.220	0.30	-1.459	-1.50	-1.135	-1.49	0.087	0.14

N	766
Pseudo R2	0.068
Likelihood ratio χ2	190.54
Prob(χ2)	0.000

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: The (excluded) baseline category is opposed (2011) to opposed (2016)—i.e., individuals who were opposed to expanded trade in 2011 and continued to hold that position in 2016.

Appendix Table A12. Full multinomial logit coefficients for effects of Trump favorability on changes in trade attitudes, Democratic identifiers, 2011-2016, Voter Study Group Survey

	Baseline (0):	1		2		3		4	
2011:	Oppose	Oppose to		Oppose to		Unsure to		Unsure to	
2016:	Oppose	Unsure		Support		Oppose		Unsure	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		-0.395	-3.22***	-0.274	-2.38**	0.029	0.22	-0.294	-3.05***
Republican Intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Democratic intensity		-0.076	-0.50	-0.192	-1.34	-0.319	-1.76	-0.297	-2.41**
Political ideology		0.007	0.05	0.008	0.06	-0.440	-2.65**	-0.237	-2.17*
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		0.184	1.03	0.095	0.55	-0.070	-0.31	0.058	0.39
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		0.044	0.26	0.394	2.40**	0.309	1.48	0.549	3.93***
Education		0.112	1.31	0.131	1.59	0.057	0.54	0.070	1.00
Family income		-0.006	-0.16	-0.033	-0.85	0.023	0.48	-0.005	-0.16
Gender		0.567	2.31**	-0.436	-2.00*	0.017	0.06	0.715	3.60***
Black		-0.119	-0.38	0.144	0.49	0.183	0.47	-0.303	-1.13
Hispanic		0.637	1.29	0.302	0.58	0.070	0.10	0.400	0.90
Asian		0.214	0.15	1.297	1.11	-11.933	-0.02	1.369	1.27
Intercept		-0.792	-1.35	-0.039	-0.07	-0.176	-0.25	0.473	0.99

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Appendix Table A12 (continued)

	Baseline (0):	5		6		7		8	
2011:	Oppose	Unsure to		Support to		Support to		Support to	
2016:	Oppose	Support		Oppose		Unsure		Support	
Variable		b	z	b	z	b	z	b	z
Trump favorability		-0.439	-4.08***	0.080	0.67	-0.190	-1.85*	-0.285	-3.55***
Republican Intensity		---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Democratic intensity		-0.240	-1.92	-0.433	-2.67**	-0.230	-1.75	-0.191	-1.75
Political ideology		-0.244	-2.18*	-0.199	-1.34	-0.113	-0.95	-0.103	-1.09
Retrospective personal economic evaluations		0.045	0.30	-0.025	-0.13	-0.047	-0.30	0.051	0.39
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations		0.536	3.77***	0.538	2.85**	0.613	4.07***	1.025	8.34***
Education		0.109	1.52	0.051	0.54	0.154	2.05*	0.261	4.24***
Family income		0.040	1.21	0.013	0.30	0.054	1.55	0.052	1.82
Gender		0.271	1.39	-0.116	-0.46	0.113	0.56	-0.556	-3.40***
Black		-0.148	-0.55	0.454	1.34	-0.185	-0.64	-0.214	-0.94
Hispanic		0.479	1.08	0.902	1.72	0.160	0.33	0.366	0.92
Asian		1.713	1.61	0.742	0.52	1.797	1.67	1.358	1.31
Intercept		0.253	0.52	-0.230	-0.37	-0.430	-0.83	0.609	1.45

N	2907
Pseudo R2	0.057
Likelihood ratio χ2	583.29
Prob(χ2)	0.000

*** prob. < 0.001 ** prob. < 0.01 *prob. < 0.05

Note: The (excluded) baseline category is opposed (2011) to opposed (2016)—i.e., individuals who were opposed to expanded trade in 2011 and continued to hold that position in 2016.